eToro × TradeZero
The Opportunity
TradeZero Holding Corp has built something remarkable from $120K in seed capital: a patented short locate ecosystem with 69% gross margins, a self-clearing license (TZ Clear), and 27K highly engaged active traders spending $2,800/year each — across 5 broker-dealers in the US, Canada, Bahamas, Europe, and soon India/UK.
But after 11 years as an independent, TradeZero is hitting the ceiling of what a $48.5M-equity company can achieve alone. The simultaneous expansion into 3 new geographies, options self-clearing, and institutional grey-labeling requires capital, distribution, and scale that only a global platform partner can provide. We propose eToro acquires TradeZero for $125–175M ($100–125M cash + $25–50M earnout) — giving TradeZero the platform its technology deserves, while adding critical US infrastructure and a countercyclical revenue stream to eToro.
Strategic Rationale — Why This Combination Makes Sense
The core thesis: TradeZero has built exceptional technology and a unique market position — but it's hitting the ceiling of what a $76M-revenue independent brokerage can achieve. With 27K active accounts, $48.5M in equity, and expansion into 3 new geographies simultaneously, TradeZero needs the scale, brand, balance sheet, and distribution that only a global platform can provide. eToro is the ideal partner to unlock TradeZero's full potential.
1. TradeZero Has Hit the Scale Wall
TradeZero's locate ecosystem, self-clearing capability, and active trader platform are genuinely world-class. But the company faces structural constraints that limit its growth as an independent:
- Capital constraints — $48.5M in equity is barely enough to support its $48.3M customer receivable book, leaving no room for aggressive growth in margin lending or self-clearing expansion
- Marketing ceiling — With a $2.9M marketing budget, TradeZero can acquire ~13K new accounts per year. eToro's global marketing engine and 38M registered user base would give TradeZero access to millions of potential active traders overnight
- Simultaneous geographic expansion — Launching TZ Europe, TZ India, and TZ UK concurrently requires capital, compliance infrastructure, and local market expertise that stretch a 185-person company thin
- Institutional credibility — The grey-label locate platform is a powerful B2B product, but institutional clients prefer dealing with larger, well-capitalized counterparties. eToro's NASDAQ-listed brand changes the conversation entirely
- Technology investment burden — $5M+/year in software development is heavy for a company with $3.9M in net income. Inside eToro, this R&D cost becomes a rounding error
2. The Locate Ecosystem Needs Distribution to Reach Its Potential
TradeZero's patented short locate ecosystem is the crown jewel — 69% gross margins, 92% fill rate, flywheel economics that improve with every additional user. But with only 27K active accounts, the flywheel is spinning slowly.
The economics of the locate ecosystem are simple: more users = more recycling = higher margins = lower costs = more users. eToro's 38M registered users represent a massive, untapped demand pool for short-selling tools. Even converting 1% of eToro's user base into active short sellers would 10× TradeZero's locate volume — dramatically expanding the flywheel and its profitability.
As an independent, TradeZero will spend years and tens of millions trying to build this user base organically. Inside eToro, it happens through a product integration.
3. Self-Clearing Is More Valuable at Scale
TZ Clear's self-clearing capability is a fixed-cost infrastructure asset — the more volume it processes, the lower the per-trade cost. At TradeZero's current 78K DARTs, TZ Clear is underutilized. Combined with eToro's US order flow, the clearing infrastructure can process 5–10× more volume at minimal incremental cost, generating significant economies of scale that benefit the combined entity.
Additionally, eToro's balance sheet strength (~$500M+ cash post-IPO) resolves TradeZero's capital constraints, enabling TZ Clear to confidently expand into options clearing and potentially correspondent clearing for third parties.
4. International Expansion — Better Together
TradeZero has proven the international playbook with TZ Canada: 19× account growth, profitable in 8 weeks, 79% gross margin. It's now replicating this in Europe, India, and the UK.
But launching broker-dealers in new jurisdictions requires local regulatory expertise, compliance infrastructure, banking relationships, and marketing presence — all things eToro already has in these markets. TradeZero's Canada success story can be replicated 5× faster inside eToro's existing international infrastructure.
Conversely, TradeZero's active trader tools and short locate platform fill a product gap in eToro's international offerings. eToro serves casual investors globally; TradeZero serves active traders. Together, they cover the full spectrum.
5. TradeZero's Founders Deserve a Liquidity Event
TradeZero was founded in 2015 with $120K from 3 founders. Eleven years later, they've built a $76M revenue business with proprietary technology, 5 broker-dealer licenses, and a patented locate ecosystem. But the founders have limited liquidity — the company pays dividends exceeding net income (which is unsustainable) and the private shares have no market.
A strategic acquisition by eToro provides the founders a well-deserved liquidity event while ensuring their technology and team continue to grow inside a larger platform. With an earnout structure tied to EBITDA targets, the founders stay incentivized to execute on the integration roadmap.
6. Countercyclical Hedge — A Natural Portfolio Fit
eToro's revenue is predominantly long-biased — users buy stocks, ETFs, and crypto. In bear markets, engagement and revenue decline. TradeZero's active short sellers represent a natural hedge: they become more active and profitable when markets fall. This combination creates a more resilient, all-weather brokerage platform.
Business Line Deep Dive
| Revenue Line | 2023A | 2024A | 2025A | % Mix | CAGR | Margin | eToro Synergy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Locates / Borrows | $5.8M | $9.3M | $16.6M | 22% | +69% | ~69% | THE MOAT. Cross-sell to eToro US users. |
| Commissions & Fees | $23.8M | $23.6M | $28.1M | 37% | +9% | ~40-50% | Platform fees + trading. Incremental to eToro. |
| Rebates (PFOF) | $5.5M | $11.1M | $19.0M | 25% | +86% | ~30-40% | Volume-driven. Scales with eToro order flow. |
| Interest & Other | $2.7M | $2.4M | $10.1M | 13% | +93% | ~80%+ | Margin lending. eToro balance sheet amplifies this. |
| License / Subscription | $13.3M | $16.7M | $2.2M | 3% | — | ~90%+ | Platform access. Reclassified between filings. |
| Total Revenue | $51.1M | $63.1M | $76.0M | 100% | +22% |
Locate Ecosystem — The Crown Jewel
How it works: When an active trader wants to short a hard-to-borrow stock, they need to "locate" shares first. TradeZero sources locates from 18 institutional partners, sells to retail customers, and when the customer covers, can recycle the locate to another customer via their patented "credit back" system.
Economics improve with each cycle: First sale generates 67% margin. Second re-use: 71%. Third: 72%. Fourth: 73%+. The more customers in the ecosystem, the more recycling, the higher the margin. This is a genuine network effect moat.
Institutional expansion: 18 institutions added since late 2023 as grey-label clients. Revenue from institutional locates grew 5× from 2023 to 2025. This B2B revenue stream is brand new and has significant expansion potential via eToro's partner network.
Customer Economics
| Metric | 2023A | 2024A | 2025A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Active Accounts (000s) | 22.1 | 24.5 | 26.9 |
| ARPU | $2,312 | $2,576 | $2,825 |
| DARTs (000s) | 53.2 | 68.5 | 78.3 |
| Avg Customer Equity ($M) | $90M | $129M | $163M |
| CAC (H2) | $344 | $188 | $223 |
| CAC Payback | 1–2 months | ||
| LTV/CAC | 65–80× | ||
Geographic Breakdown (2025)
TZ Canada case study: $11.2M revenue, 79% gross margin, 19× account growth since inception, profitable in just 8 weeks. This is the international expansion playbook — replicable in EU, India, and UK.
EBITDA vs. Net Income — The $21M Gap
TradeZero management pitches $24.8M adjusted EBITDA at 33% margins. But reported net income was just $164K in 2024 and an estimated ~$3.9M in 2025. Understanding this gap is critical for valuation.
Why Each Gap Matters
| Component | Amount | Impact | Acquirer Perspective |
|---|---|---|---|
| D&A | $8.0M | Non-cash, but reflects $40M+ past software investment | Acquirer writes off or revalues. D&A > CapEx by $2.6M = real cash generation above EBITDA. |
| SBC | $3.8M | Non-cash, but dilutive | eToro would restructure equity comp post-acquisition. Standard add-back. |
| Credit Losses | $1.0M | Reserve on $48.3M receivable book | Only 2% reserved. 2023 blowup was $4.9M. Major risk factor. |
| Taxes | $3.3M | 46% effective rate — multi-jurisdictional complexity | eToro can optimize with its existing global tax structure. Potential savings. |
| Interest | $1.0M | 14× increase in 2 years | Cost of funding margin lending. eToro's balance sheet reduces this cost. |
Key insight for valuation: The seller will argue EBITDA multiples (~8× = $200M). The buyer should anchor on net income multiples where TradeZero's near-zero earnings produce a much lower valuation — and then add a controlled synergy premium to arrive at the offer price.
Synergy Analysis
Cost Synergies — $8–14M Annual (Year 1–2)
| Initiative | Savings | Timeline | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bring eToro US onto TZ Clear (eliminate third-party clearing) | $2–4M | 12–18 months | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ High |
| Headcount optimization (overlapping compliance, legal, ops) | $3–5M | 6–12 months | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ High |
| Technology infrastructure consolidation | $1–2M | 12–24 months | ⭐⭐⭐ Medium |
| Eliminate duplicate compliance/legal across BDs | $2–3M | 6–12 months | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ High |
| Total Cost Synergies | $8–14M |
Revenue Synergies — $23–45M Incremental (Year 2–3)
| Initiative | Revenue | Timeline | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-sell locates to eToro's US active traders | $5–10M | 12–24 months | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ High |
| Offer active trader tools to eToro's 38M registered users | $10–20M | 18–36 months | ⭐⭐⭐ Medium |
| Options trading for eToro users via TZ infrastructure | $5–10M | 12–24 months | ⭐⭐⭐ Medium |
| Grey-label locate platform to eToro partner network | $3–5M | 12–18 months | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ High |
| Total Revenue Synergies | $23–45M |
Strategic Synergies (Not Easily Quantifiable)
- Full US vertical integration — Order routing → execution → clearing → settlement, all in-house
- B2B revenue stream — eToro has never had institutional/grey-label revenue. TradeZero's platform creates a new business line
- Proprietary trading technology — $40M+ invested in platform development. Best components absorbed into eToro's stack
- International BD network — Accelerates eToro's licensing in Canada, Caribbean, and EU
- Countercyclical revenue — Short sellers are more active in bear markets, providing natural hedge to eToro's long-biased user base
- AI co-pilot (TradeZero Developer) — Launched Feb 2026. Aligns with eToro's AI agent strategy
Three-Year Financial Summary
Income Statement ($M)
| Line Item | FY2023A | FY2024A | FY2025A | CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue | $51.1 | $63.1 | $76.0 | +22% |
| Compensation & Benefits | $23.4 | $25.6 | ~$26.5 | |
| Securities Lending | $8.2 | $8.7 | ~$9.0 | |
| D&A | $6.3 | $7.5 | ~$8.0 | |
| SBC | $5.8 | $4.3 | ~$3.8 | |
| All Other OpEx | $13.4 | $17.0 | ~$17.5 | |
| Total OpEx | $57.1 | $63.1 | ~$64.8 | |
| Other (Income)/Expense | $0.3 | ($3.4)* | ~$0 | |
| Pre-Tax Income | ($5.3) | $3.2 | ~$7.2 | |
| Net Income | ($4.2) | $0.2 | ~$3.9 | |
| Adj. EBITDA | $14.0 | $19.5 | $24.8 | +33% |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin | 27% | 31% | 33% |
*2024 includes $3.3M one-time gain from release of customer payable per external legal opinion. Without this, 2024 pre-tax income was approximately $(0.2M).
Balance Sheet Highlights ($M) — Dec 31
| Item | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $21.1 | $20.7 | $28.4 |
| Receivables from Customers | $2.5 | $5.3 | $48.3 |
| Total Assets | $85.8 | $81.8 | $110.9 |
| Payable to Customers | $32.2 | $33.0 | $31.8 |
| Due to Clearing Brokers | — | — | $25.4 |
| Total Liabilities | $42.0 | $36.8 | $62.4 |
| Total Equity | $43.8 | $45.0 | $48.5 |
Cash Flow ($M)
| FY2023 | FY2024 | |
|---|---|---|
| Operating CF | $4.8 | $18.2 |
| Investing CF | ($5.8) | ($5.4) |
| Financing CF | ($1.0) | ($0.8) |
| Net Change | ($2.2) | $11.8 |
Note: 2024 operating CF inflated by $25.4M "Due to Clearing Brokers" (liability increase = cash source). Adjusted for this timing item, underlying operating CF was approximately $(7.2M).
🚩 Red Flags & Valuation Anchors
These risks directly inform the $125–175M valuation range and discount from management's implied $200M ask.
🔴 Critical Risk #1: Customer Receivables — Existential Concentration
Customer receivables exploded 9× from $5.3M to $48.3M in a single year. This represents 99.6% of total equity ($48.5M). Only $1.1M is provisioned against it (2.3%).
For context: In 2023, credit losses were $4.9M on a much smaller book. If just 10% of the current $48.3M goes bad, it wipes net income 12 times over. A 20% default scenario would impair equity by $9.7M — a devastating blow to a $48.5M equity base.
Valuation impact: This risk alone justifies a 30–40% discount to any EBITDA-based valuation.
🔴 Critical Risk #2: Near-Zero Net Income
FY2024 net income: $164K. FY2023: $(4.2M) loss. Two out of three years were losses or break-even. The $3.3M gain in 2024 from releasing a customer payable was a one-time legal opinion-based adjustment — without it, 2024 was negative.
TradeZero has never demonstrated sustained profitability at the net income level.
🔴 Critical Risk #3: EBITDA Adjustments Are Aggressive
The walk from reported EBITDA ($16.2M) to "adjusted" EBITDA ($24.8M) adds back $8.6M — including SBC ($3.8M), credit provisions ($1.0M), and "other" ($3.8M). These add-backs represent 35% of the headline EBITDA number.
| Red Flag | Detail | Valuation Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Receivables 9× growth | $5.3M → $48.3M. 99.6% of equity. Only 2.3% reserved. | −30 to −40% discount |
| Net income: $164K (2024) | Two of three years negative. One-time gain masked 2024. | Anchors on NI multiples, not EBITDA |
| D&A = $8M/yr | $40M+ software spend amortizing over 5 years. | Suppresses EBIT for 3–5 more years |
| Dividends > Earnings | $2.3M paid out on $164K income. Retained earnings declining. | Capital allocation concern |
| Interest expense 14×'d | $61K (2023) → $838K (2024). Funding margin book growth. | Growing cost base |
| 46% effective tax rate | Multi-jurisdictional complexity. Cash going out the door. | Opportunity for buyer to optimize |
| SBC: $4.3M on $164K NI | Massive dilution relative to actual profits. | Restructure post-acquisition |
| Related party receivable: $3.3M | Persistent, barely moves. Unexplained in detail. | DD required |
| Revenue reclassifications | License/Sub: $13.3M in 2023 filing → $2.2M in 2025 deck. | Reporting reliability concern |
| Regulatory complexity | 5 BDs across 4+ jurisdictions. Change-of-control: 12–18 months. | Execution risk + timeline premium |
🔬 Deep Dive: The $48.3M Customer Receivables Problem
This is the single most important risk factor in the entire deal. It requires detailed analysis because it could be either (a) a well-collateralized margin lending book that's a sign of growth, or (b) a ticking time bomb that could impair the entire equity base.
The Numbers Tell a Disturbing Story
| Metric | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Receivables from Customers (net) | $2.5M | $5.3M | $48.3M | +811% YoY |
| Provision for Credit Losses (P&L) | $0.4M | $4.9M | $1.1M | |
| Total Equity | $43.8M | $45.0M | $48.5M | |
| Receivables / Equity | 5.7% | 11.8% | 99.6% | 🚨 |
| Provision / Receivables | — | — | 2.3% | Severely under-reserved |
What Happened in 2024?
Customer receivables grew 9× in a single year — from $5.3M to $48.3M. Simultaneously, a new balance sheet item appeared: "Due to Clearing Brokers" at $25.4M (did not exist in prior years). These are almost certainly linked.
Most likely explanation: TZ Clear began self-clearing more customer trades in 2024 (international equities self-clearing launched June 2024). When a customer trades on margin through a self-clearing broker, the broker carries the customer's debit balance as a receivable. Previously, the external clearing firm carried this risk. Now TradeZero carries it directly.
This means TradeZero went from outsourcing credit risk (clearing firm holds the receivable) to internalizing credit risk (TradeZero holds a $48.3M receivable against $48.5M of equity).
Why This Is Dangerous
Scenario A: 10% Default
Loss: $4.8M
Impact: Wipes net income 12× over. Reduces equity by 10%. Manageable but painful.
Probability: Medium — this happened in 2023 when credit losses hit $4.9M on a much smaller book.
Scenario B: 20% Default
Loss: $9.7M
Impact: Wipes 20% of equity. May trigger regulatory capital concerns at BD level. Potential liquidity crisis.
Probability: Low-Medium — possible in a sharp market correction or "meme stock" crash.
Scenario C: 30% Default
Loss: $14.5M
Impact: Wipes 30% of equity. Likely triggers net capital violations. May require emergency capital raise or forced liquidation of positions.
Probability: Low — requires sustained market dislocation.
Scenario D: Concentrated Blow-Up
Loss: Unknown — could exceed 30%
Impact: If the receivable book is concentrated in a few large accounts or correlated positions (e.g., short squeeze), losses could be catastrophic and rapid.
Probability: Unknown — no data on concentration.
The 2023 Precedent
In FY2023, TradeZero recorded $4.9M in credit losses (labeled "Customer bad debt") — this was the single largest operating expense increase that year, rising from just $0.4M in 2022. The 2023 receivable book was only $5.3M, implying a ~93% default rate on incremental receivables that year.
If a similar credit event occurs on the current $48.3M book, losses could reach $10–20M+, potentially requiring a capital injection.
Comparison to Industry Standards
| Metric | TradeZero | Interactive Brokers | Robinhood | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Customer Receivables / Equity | 99.6% | ~200-300% | ~50-80% | IBKR can handle this because they have $15B+ equity. TradeZero has $48.5M. |
| Provision / Receivables | 2.3% | ~0.5-1% | ~1-3% | IBKR provisions less because they have sophisticated real-time liquidation systems and massive scale diversification. |
| Risk Management Infrastructure | Growing | World-class | Adequate | TradeZero has "Turbo Tick" monitoring but is early in self-clearing journey. |
| Scale of Equity Base | $48.5M | $15B+ | $7B+ | TradeZero has no margin for error. One bad week could be existential. |
What the Acquirer Must Determine
Before any offer is made, eToro must obtain and analyze:
- Aging schedule — How old are the receivables? Current vs. 30/60/90+ days past due?
- Concentration analysis — Top 10 accounts as % of total. Top 50. Any single account >5%?
- Collateral coverage — What's the loan-to-value ratio? Are positions marked to market daily?
- Margin call history — How frequently are margin calls issued? What's the cure rate?
- Correlation risk — Are positions concentrated in specific sectors, meme stocks, or short squeezes?
- Historical write-off rates — Monthly/quarterly loss experience since TZ Clear launched self-clearing
- Liquidation protocols — How quickly can positions be force-liquidated? What's the slippage in a stress scenario?
- Customer segmentation — Retail vs. institutional. Active traders vs. buy-and-hold. Short sellers vs. long only.
Valuation Implications
| Receivable Quality | Discount to EV | Implied Valuation Range | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Well-collateralized, diversified | 10–15% | $170–180M | Standard margin lending risk. Manageable with proper systems. |
| Moderately concentrated | 25–35% | $130–150M | Some concentration risk requires capital reserves and enhanced monitoring. |
| Highly concentrated or poorly collateralized | 40–50% | $100–120M | Significant tail risk. Requires escrow or indemnification from sellers. |
| Unknown (no DD access) | 35–40% | $120–130M | Absence of data = assume the worst. Price accordingly. |
The customer receivable book is the #1 variable that moves this deal between $100M and $175M.
Until the acquirer has full visibility into collateral quality, concentration, and aging — the valuation should assume moderate-to-high risk and price at $125–150M, with upside adjustments only after DD confirms the book is clean.
Valuation — Anchoring $125–175M
Comparable Net Income Multiples
| Company | Market Cap | Revenue | Net Income | P/E | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marex Group (MRX) | $3.0B | $2.7B | $266M | 11.9× | Global commodities broker, clearing, risk management. LSE-listed. |
| StoneX Group (SNEX) | $6.7B | $142B* | $348M | 19.1× | Multi-asset financial services. Clearing, execution, FX, commodities. |
| eToro (ETOR) | $2.7B | $13.7B* | $216M | 14.4× | Social trading platform. Retail-focused. Recently IPO'd. |
| Median P/E | 14.4× |
*Revenue includes gross trading volume. Net revenue metrics differ significantly.
Applied to TradeZero
| Methodology | Metric | Multiple | Implied Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported NI (2024) × Median P/E | $0.164M | 14.4× | $2.4M |
| Estimated NI (2025) × Median P/E | $3.9M | 14.4× | $56M |
| Normalized NI × Median P/E | $5.5M | 14.4× | $79M |
| Normalized NI × High P/E (StoneX) | $5.5M | 19.1× | $105M |
| Adj. EBITDA × 5× (discounted) | $24.8M | 5.0× | $124M |
| Adj. EBITDA × 7× (generous) | $24.8M | 7.0× | $174M |
| Revenue × 1.6× (low) | $76M | 1.6× | $122M |
| Revenue × 2.3× (high) | $76M | 2.3× | $175M |
| Book Value (floor) | $48.5M | 1.0× | $49M |
| DCF Bear Case | — | — | $125M |
5–7× Adj. EBITDA | 1.6–2.3× Revenue | 23–32× Normalized NI
Why NOT $200M (Seller's Likely Ask)
- $200M = 8× adj. EBITDA. That's a public company growth multiple for a private company with $164K net income.
- Marex trades at 11.9× NET INCOME — and Marex earns $266M, not $164K.
- $48M receivable risk = buyer should demand a 30–40% discount to any EBITDA-based framework.
- Two of three years were losses. You don't pay growth multiples for a company that hasn't demonstrated sustained profitability.
- $8.6M in EBITDA add-backs (35% of headline number) — aggressive adjustments inflate the metric.
- Private company + regulatory complexity + 12–18 month change-of-control approval = illiquidity discount.
Proposed Deal Structure
| Component | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Cash at Close | $100–125M | Immediate consideration |
| Earnout (2027–2028) | $25–50M | Tied to adj. EBITDA targets ($30M+ for 2027, $40M+ for 2028) |
| Management Retention | Equity rollover | 3-year lock, vesting tied to integration milestones |
| Total Consideration | $125–175M |
Returns to eToro
At $150M acquisition cost with $31–59M annual synergies:
Better Together — Why Now
TradeZero has built something remarkable: a patented short locate ecosystem, self-clearing infrastructure, and a loyal base of active traders — all from $120K in seed capital. But after 11 years as an independent, the company is hitting the limits of what a $76M-revenue, $48.5M-equity brokerage can achieve on its own.
The expansion into Europe, India, and the UK — while simultaneously scaling self-clearing, institutional grey-labeling, and options — requires capital, distribution, and infrastructure that TradeZero doesn't have as a standalone. This isn't a weakness; it's the natural inflection point where a great niche business needs a platform partner to reach its full potential.
What TradeZero Unlocks Inside eToro
What eToro Gains
For TradeZero's founders & team
- Liquidity event after 11 years of building
- Their technology reaches millions, not thousands
- Locate ecosystem flywheel accelerates 10×
- Balance sheet support removes capital constraints
- International expansion backed by eToro's existing licenses
- Institutional credibility of a NASDAQ-listed parent
- Earnout structure rewards continued execution
For eToro shareholders
- US clearing infrastructure ($2–4M annual savings)
- Active trader product suite — new revenue stream
- Short-selling capability — countercyclical hedge
- B2B institutional grey-label revenue (new business line)
- Options & futures infrastructure acceleration
- $31–59M in annual synergies vs. $125–175M price
- 2.5–5 year payback on acquisition cost
TradeZero's technology and market position are exceptional. Its challenge is scale — and that's exactly what eToro provides. This isn't about eToro needing active traders; it's about TradeZero's innovations deserving the global platform they were built for.
At $125–175M, the price reflects TradeZero's actual earnings power and the real risks in the business — while the $31–59M in annual synergies ensure both sides create substantial value from the combination.